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In the preliminary ruling delivered on 19 November 2019 in Joined Cases C-585/18,
C-624/18 and 625/18, A.K. and others, the European Court of Justice established
a detailed method for assessing the independence (or lack thereof) of courts. The
judicial independence test laid down by the ECJ, however, may not be entirely fit for
the purpose of assessing the lawfulness of courts and judges which are established
and appointed on the basis of flawed procedures by bodies arguably violating basic
judicial independence requirements as established in EU law. The ECJ appears
to limit the required verification under EU law to the issue of independence only.
Instead, the reviewing body should, first, check whether the challenged court (judge)
is “established by law” and only then, if necessary, follow up on the examination of
its independence. Today, the Polish Supreme Court has the opportunity to step up
and give full effect to that criterion.
1. Background
The references for a preliminary ruling brought by the Polish Supreme Court
related to the verification of independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of that
Court. It had been created and staffed in 2018, as part of the controversial and
arguably unconstitutional changes introduced in the Polish judicial system to
strengthen the influence of the legislative and executive bodies over the judiciary.
The independence test established by the ECJ built on its previous case law
and aimed in particular to enable the Supreme Court to determine whether the
Disciplinary Chamber satisfies the judicial independence requirements established in
EU law and, accordingly, whether it is a “court” within the meaning of EU law.
On the basis of the approach and key factors laid down in the ECJ preliminary ruling,
the Supreme Court (Chamber of Labour and Social Security) already issued three
rulings: one on 5 December 2019 (Case III PO 7/18) and two on 15 January 2020
(Cases III PO 8/18 and III PO 9/18). In all three of them it held that the Disciplinary
Chamber of the Supreme Court, due to its lack of independence, is not a court
within the meaning of EU law. The ECJ ruling was also referred to by the Supreme
Court’s Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs which arguably lacks
independence as well. In a resolution of 8 January 2020 (Case I NOZP 3/19),
while pretending to follow the A.K. judgment, the Chamber attempted to limit it
considerably stating that: (1) control is not possible ex officio, but only at the request
of a party; (2) determination of the lack of independence of the National Council
of the Judiciary (KRS), which has been suspended by the ENCJ in 2018 for its
lack of independence, is not sufficient – it is necessary to determine the lack of
independence of the specific judge nominated by the KRS.
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Due to differences that have already arisen in the various compositions of the
Supreme Court, on 23 January 2020 the Supreme Court, in an enlarged composition
of three “old” chambers (without the two “new” chambers appointed back in 2018)
is meant to resolve these inconsistencies and set a binding standard for other
Polish courts in the application of the ECJ ruling. It remains unclear whether this
decision will be adopted by the Supreme Court as scheduled and, if so, whether
the executive and legislative bodies will comply with it, as they take a number of
measures to prevent the Supreme Court from sitting or preclude implementation
of the decision (e.g. groundless requests to the politically captured Constitutional
Tribunal or unfounded decisions on interim measures, etc.).
2. The “independence test” vis-à-vis the
“establishment test”
Both Article 6 (1) ECHR and Article 47 of the EU Charter indicate the “establishment
by law” as the first, most preliminary requirement for a court, and the guarantee
of a fair trial. The verification should therefore begin with the question: is the
court established by law? If the answer is yes, it is only then that the examination
continues, i.e. whether the court is independent, and then, if it is impartial. If the
court is not established by law, the examination should be discontinued. Nothing else
needs to be checked in that case, because there is no object of inspection anymore,
since there is no court (judge). Once the latter is determined, the test should come
to an end and the authority carrying out the verification could then possibly define
further consequences of the act (or perhaps a non-act) of the non-court (non-judge).
For the time being, the perspective as adopted in the A.K. ruling suggests that it is
the “independence” factor that should be assessed and qualify or disqualify a body
as a court. The test specified by the ECJ starts “too late” from the point of view of the
guarantees of Article 6 (1) ECHR and Article 47 of the EU Charter. When assessing
the circumstances of the creation of a court or the appointment of a judge, the ECJ
links them, in this ruling, with the guarantee of independence, yet it does not link
them directly to the requirement that the court (judge) is to “be established by law”.
Thus, the verification of whether an authority is a court, or a person is a judge, does
not begin with the very first question that should indeed be asked. That question is
overlooked and the assessment focuses on the next step of examining the qualities
of the court (the judge). This lowers the level of protection of the judiciary from the
point of view of the rule of law, and consequently, may adversely affect the exercise
of the individual right to a court.
It is fair to note, however, that the two tests are not entirely separated from each
other, as the “independence test” may involve elements of the “establishment test”,
e.g. related to the mode or circumstances of appointment of judges (see ECJ, A.K.,
paras. 127 and 146). Thus, the requirements relating to the establishment test, may,
to some extent, be indirectly reviewed under the independence test via control of
relevant external and internal factors associated with judicial independence.
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Nevertheless, the difference between the “establishment test” and the
“independence test” may often be crucial. A finding that a court (a judge) is not
established by law may be possible on the basis of objective criteria not directly
related to the individual court (judge). In line with the established case-law of the
European Court of Human Rights, the finding of a flagrant violation of law in the
process of establishing the court (or appointing the judge) would be sufficient. It
does not necessarily be related to the particular person. Whereas the assessment of
independence, as indicated by the ECJ, is indeed construed as a more individualized
concept of a verification which takes account of particular considerations related to
the circumstances in which that very court was created (or judge appointed), the
functioning of the body as well as its perception (appearance) in society and by the
litigants. Such an assessment is by its nature more complex and difficult, and may
eventually lead to differing opinions on similar situations reached by different bodies
carrying out the verification.
The approach adopted so far is methodologically questionable, since it is incomplete.
It allows for cases where it will not be proven that the relevant specific court, or
specific unit within the relevant court, or a specific judge or group of judges are not
independent, even though there may well be a violation of the “established by law”
requirement.
3. A court “established by law”
Rooted in the very principle of the rule of law, the expression “established by law”
refers not only to the legislative basis for the existence of the judicial body, but also
to its composition in each case it considers (see ECtHR, Lavents v Latvia, paras.
82 and 114; ECtHR, Ilatovskiy v Russia, para. 36; General Court of the EU, FV
v Council, para. 68). Thus the requirement to establish the “court” by law entails,
in particular, the requirement that a “judge” sitting in that court, be appointed by
law. The judicial bodies which are composed with the participation of unlawfully
appointed persons will therefore not meet the requirement of Article 6 (1) ECHR and,
consequently, Article 47 of the EU Charter.
There are two basic implications for the assessment of the legality of an individual
judge or specific court stemming from the “establishment” criterion: (a) the law
should determine the substantive criteria and procedure for judicial appointments,
and (b) that law must indeed be strictly observed (ECtHR, Ilatovskiy v Russia, paras.
40-41; General Court of the EU, FV v Council, paras. 74-75). The requirement
that the judge is lawfully appointed, eventually is meant to safeguard judicial
independence from illegitimate interference of the political powers (ECtHR,
Gorguiladzé v Georgia, para. 69; ECtHR, Pandjikidzé v Georgia, para. 105;
General Court of the EU, FV v Council, para. 68). It provides a genuine basis for
the independence and impartiality of the person appointed as a judge. However, in
order to find that there is no “judge”, it is sufficient to conclude that he or she has
not been legally appointed. There is no further need to consider his or her lack of
independence or impartiality. The failure to appoint a judge in accordance with the
law results in the lack of a court established by law by definition. This constitutes an
autonomous breach because of the primary nature of the requirement is infringed.
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The failure in this respect renders any further examination under Article 6 (1) ECHR
or Article 47 of the EU Charter superfluous, since the guarantees embodied therein
can no longer be met by an authority lacking the very attribute of being a court.
The European Court of Human Rights held that such a body is not capable of
guaranteeing a fair trial to the persons within its jurisdiction (ECtHR, Pandjikidzé
v Georgia, para. 105; see also the Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston,
Réexamen Simpson v Council, para. 63).
4. The nature and gravity of infringement – a flagrant
violation of law
In the first place, it is for the domestic courts to assess whether an infringement of
the law in the process of judicial appointments results in a refusal to recognize the
person as a judge (ECtHR, DMD Group A.S. v. Slovakia, para. 61). They are better
suited to interpret and apply provisions of domestic legislation. Here, the European
Court of Human Rights has repeatedly invoked the threshold of a “flagrant violation”
of law as the one which leads to the conclusion that the appointment of a judge does
not meet the European standard and constitutes a violation of Article 6 (1) EHCR
(e.g. ECtHR, Lavents v Latvia, para. 114; ECtHR, DMD Group A.S. v. Slovakia,
para. 61; ECtHR, Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v Iceland, para. 100). The national
court may therefore disqualify a person as a judge also for reasons which do not
meet the threshold of a flagrant violation of law. It follows that the domestic body
cannot consider a person appointed in flagrant breach of legal rules to be a lawful
judge. In any case, the ECtHR will not be bound by the national court’s appraisal.
The facts established by the domestic court may be subject to the ECtHR’s scrutiny
and an autonomous assessment. In a chamber judgment in the case of Ástráðsson
v. Iceland (currently pending before the Grand Chamber), the ECtHR considered the
deficiencies in the appointment of a national judge to amount to a flagrant breach of
law, even though the Icelandic Supreme Court classified them as irregularities that
do not disqualify the judge.
The criterion of a flagrant breach of law may lack precision, yet national courts,
as well as the ECtHR and the ECJ, have considerable experience in applying it.
In principle, it refers to a process that is manifestly contrary to explicit legal rules.
A manifest breach involves a striking discrepancy between the way in which the
appointment process should have been carried out, and the actual way it had
been carried out. The ECtHR also pointed to a possible intentional nature of the
infringements and indicated that it takes into account whether the facts before it
demonstrate that a breach was deliberate or, at a minimum, constituted a manifest
disregard of the applicable national law (para. 102; the verification of intentionality of
State authorities (their “true aims”) was also recommended by the ECJ in the context
of making legislative changes in the judicial system, see ECJ, Commission v Poland,
paras. 80 et seq.). Invoking both the rule of law and separation of powers, the Court
determined in Ástráðsson the need to “look behind appearances and ascertain
whether a breach of the applicable national rules on the appointment of judges
created a real risk that the other organs of Government, in particular the executive,
exercised undue discretion undermining the integrity of the appointment process
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to an extent not envisaged by the national rules in force at the material time” (para.
103).
Accordingly, the threshold of a flagrant violation means that the appointment process
was flawed in a manner that would have had a substantial impact on (a) whether
the process would have been completed at all – if someone was appointed; or
(b) what the outcome of the process would have been – who would have been
appointed. The concept of a flagrant breach of legal rules relates thus to the nature
and gravity of the alleged breach (ECtHR, Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v Iceland,
para. 102). It provides a rigorous category which is meant to distinguish between
ordinary irregularities and the infringements so fundamental that the decision
reached becomes unacceptable. A flagrant violation of law leads to the nullification
of the results of the appointment procedure and denies legitimacy to the person thus
appointed.
5. The Polish context
The criterion of lack of a court established by law resulting from a breach of law
in the judges’ appointment process could be argued to be as indispensable and
possibly more appropriate than the independence test, to examine the controversial
judicial appointments made to the Supreme Court and in particular to the two new
chambers established in 2018. The “established by law” test could also be applied to
the (unconstitutional) appointment to the Constitutional Tribunal of duplicate-judges,
that is, persons elected to the positions previously lawfully taken.
For example, and as a kind of non-exhaustive illustration, in the selection and
appointment of judges to the newly created chambers of the Supreme Court, at
least the following breaches of the rules relevant for the nomination process can be
identified, and it may be argued that each of them meets the threshold of a flagrant
violation of law:
• the process was initiated by the act of the President of the Republic without the
necessary counter-signature on the part of the Prime Minister – a requirement
stemming directly from the Constitution that no ordinary legislation could have
exempted and in fact did not exempt;
• submission by the KRS of its resolutions containing requests on the nomination
to judicial positions to the President of the Republic before they became final,
i.e., before the deadline for the interested parties to appeal them had expired;
• failure of the KRS to transfer an appeal from its resolution to the Supreme
Administrative Court, which had jurisdiction to consider it;
• failure of the KRS and the President of the Republic to comply with a decision
on interim measures issued by the Supreme Administrative Court that
suspended the implementation of the KRS resolution pending the appeal
proceedings.
The “establishment test” can also be invoked in order to evaluate judicial
nominations made with the participation of the National Council of the Judiciary
(KRS) after it was re-staffed in 2018, if it is determined that the election of new
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judges-members was made in violation of legal rules. In the latter context it is
sufficient to point to: (1) the premature termination of the four-year term of office of
previous judges-members of the KRS guaranteed by the Constitution; (2) election
of new judges-members of the KRS by the Sejm, in excess of the powers explicitly
attributed to the parliamentary body by the Constitution (previously these members
were elected by the peers).
In the above cases it may be superfluous to examine the issue of independence.
The finding of a (flagrant) violation of the law in the process of appointing a judge
should be sufficient. Naturally, one needs to be aware of the possible (massive)
consequences of such a concept, but that consideration should not affect the
mechanism of verification itself, that is, the logical sequence of steps to be taken
and questions to be asked. Should such an assessment lead to significant negative
consequences for the system of justice or for the domestic legal order, the adoption
of transitional legislation may be the appropriate remedial mechanism. One cannot
however reward repeated flagrant violations of national and European law in the
name of legal certainty.
6. Why has the ECJ confined itself to the
independence test?
It is only fair to ask, why the ECJ in its ruling of 19 November 2019, adopted
a formula which seems to limit the examination of a “court” to the attribute of
independence. It has done so primarily because that is how the preliminary
references were formulated by the Supreme Court. This can be reduced to the
following wording: Is the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court an independent
court within the meaning of EU law? (paras. 51–52) It would have been more
accurate to phrase them, or expand them, in the following way: Is the Disciplinary
Chamber a court established by law within the meaning of EU law? In the judicial
dialogue mechanism based on Article 267 TFEU it is for the national court to
determine the content of the questions asked. An incomplete ECJ answer, too
narrow for the genuine task facing the national court, is, in the first place, due to the
scope of the references for a preliminary ruling.
It could be argued that the Court may have perhaps reformulated the questions, as
it does frequently, yet extending them to cover the elements not explicitly included
by the referring court, could again be challenged, considering that the test of
“establishment by law” is a different one from the independence test. Nevertheless,
I would argue that the ECJ, when responding to the questions raised, could have
supplemented them – or more accurately, “preceded” them, by pointing to the
test of establishment by law. Firstly, as has already become a tradition, especially
noticeable in cases involving changes in the Polish judiciary, the ECJ offers a more
general part in its rulings, a kind of manual of legal standards which are applicable
to the appraisal of issues brought before the Court. It did similarly in this ruling as
well (see paras. 115 et seq.). It could perhaps have added a paragraph to indicate
a more complete test. Secondly, it would only be consistent with the objectives of
references for a preliminary ruling made in these cases by the domestic court, to
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mention additionally the element of “establishment by law”. The intention of the
requesting court was to make an assessment of the lawfulness of a judicial body.
And that includes the establishment test. Ultimately, the content of the ECJ’s replies
was thus fully valid, yet not sufficient.
The ECJ will still have an opportunity to come back to these issues, for example,
in cases C-487/19 W.#. and C-508/19 Prokurator Krajowy, in which the Supreme
Court does formulate the preliminary references to the ECJ in the “establishment
test” language. In those references the Supreme Court itself pointed to the criterion
of a “flagrant violation of domestic law” as the one suggested for carrying out the
test. Therefore, anticipating the ECJ’s response, which should not be different from
the position of the European Court of Human Rights, the Supreme Court could
incorporate this test into its reasoning.
7. Conclusions
There are essentially three ways to improve the ECJ’s test of verification of a court
and structure it correctly according to the model indicated above. First, the Supreme
Court may adjust the test itself by supplementing it with a stage preceding the test
described in the ruling of 19 November 2019. It should be emphasized that such a
method is absolutely appropriate, it is permissible on the basis of the ECJ judgment
and ensures full respect for it. There is nothing in the ECJ ruling that would prohibit
or hinder the addition of a logically preceding stage. Secondly, it is possible to wait
for the ECJ to reply to subsequent references for a preliminary ruling in which the
questions have already been formulated from the perspective of examining the
establishment of the court. It is unlikely that the Court in Luxembourg would here
depart from the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights with regard to a
court established by law. Thirdly, a party to a domestic proceeding which does not
agree with the finding, based solely on the independence test, that the body which
adjudicated the case was a “court”, is still authorized to lodge an individual complaint
with the Strasbourg Court alleging a violation of Article 6 (1) ECHR.
The most appropriate way appears to be the first option. It enables to settle the
issue on the lowest possible level, that is, the domestic one, unless this proves
impossible due to non-legal reasons. The second and particularly the third option
imply a significant elapse of time and a prolonged situation of legal uncertainty.
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